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Competition among accounting standard setters:
A property rights analysis
Abstract
This paper develops a property rights analysis of competion among accounting
standard setters. The takings decision is costly as it imposes some form of
compensation to be paid to a national accounting standard setter whose property
rights to issue accounting standards are taken away and conferred instead on a
competing standard setting body, the IASC.  Applying a scenario developed by
Giammarino and Nosal (1994), a political-game play model is presented which
assumes four participants: (a) IOSCO; (b) a national-based regulatory authority; and
(c) a national-based accounting standard setting body and the IASC who compete for
the right to set international-GAAP. The optimal linear compensation rule for the
takings decision is found to depend upon with which interest group the regulatory
authority’s preferences coincide.
Keywords: property rights, accounting standards, compensation.
JEL Classifications: M41,  L51, K11
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1. Introduction
In mid-1998 a set of core accounting standards developed by the International
Accounting Standards Committee (‘IASC’) will be submitted for endorsement by the
International Organization of Securities Commission Organizations (‘IOSCO’).
International Accounting Standards (‘IASs’) are already accepted in countries where
prior national-based accounting standards do not exist (e.g.: China, Eastern Europe,
Russia), but they are still yet to be endorsed in Anglo-American countries with
established, national-based accounting standards. This raises the question of how
national-based political authorities in Anglo-American countries intend to implement
IASs by taking away equivalent accounting rule-making powers of national-based
accounting standard setting bodies. This paper applies the economic theory of the
taking of property rights to develop a model of competition among two accounting
standard setters (a national based and a competing international-based accounting
standard setter) for political influence over the decision to endorse international-
GAAP accounting standards that are sanctioned by IOSCO.1 This approach provides a
number of new insights into evaluating the relative social costs and benefits of such a
decision.
In this case, IOSCO is assumed to retain the right to take away from a national
accounting standard setter its discretion over the determination of accounting
standards affecting multinational firms which seek listing status on the world’s stock
markets. This political discretion is assumed to be granted by a regulatory authority.
The IASC competes with the national accounting standard setter over this property
right. This problem setting is applicable to those countries where the voluntary use of
IASC standards for financial reporting by multinationals firms has already forced
national political authorities to consider appropriating existing rule-making powers
from national standard setting bodies.2
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I assume that the political decision to take away these property rights from the
national standard setter will impose costs in terms of the ‘market value’ of political
influence over the determination of accounting standards that are gained or lost from
endorsing IASC-based standards. The central problem addressed by this paper is how
this ‘market value’ is assessed, under alternative assumptions about the preferences of
the national regulator, in determining the compensation schedule that determines the
price for taking property rights.3 The compensation schedule is initially predetermined
by IOSCO but may be subsequently altered by the regulatory authority in determining
which standard setter should be granted standard setting property rights.4
This form of analysis is based on the property rights literature, which
examines the power of politicians and their publicly-funded delegated regulatory
authorities to take property rights away from private citizens. The literature assumes
that government should pay for the property it takes in order to promote efficiency.
The analytical model utilised in this paper applies an argument developed by
Giammarino and Nosal (1994) which finds that an optimal compensation scheme
must be related to the market value of the taken property.
  This form of analysis is appropriate to examine recently emerging
competition among the IASC and national standard setters over what form of
accounting standards are acceptable for multinational firms to meet international
stock exchange listing requirements. It also bears upon the interaction of public and
private-funded accounting regulators. By considering IOSCO’s ultimate power to take
away property rights and the consequent implement issues, this analysis is more
comprehensive than that used by prior accounting studies of accounting standard
setting activities, which typically assume either that one interest group dominates all
others (e.g.: corporate managers – Watts, 1977) or examines interactions between
regulators absent any takings decision (e.g.: the interaction of the Financial
Accounting Standards Board and the Securities and Exchanges Commission -
Melumad and Shibao, 1994). These prior researchers rely on an economic theory of
regulation that one group typically exerts most political pressure (e.g.: Stigler, 1971)
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and/or will seek to mitigate their opponents (e.g.: Pelzman, 1976). By contrast the
model developed in this paper is consistent with Becker’s (1983) theory of
competition among pressure groups for political influence, which analyses competing
political, regulatory and pressure group influences over politically contentious issues.5
The analysis presented in this paper can thus provide powerful insights into the
increasing world-wide debate as to whether national- or IASC-based accounting
standards are most appropriate for multinational firms seeking to meet international
stock exchange listing requirements.6
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the
taking of private property rights from a national accounting standard setter to set
accounting standards appropriate for multinational firms to meet international stock
exchange listing requirements. Section 3 develops hypotheses about how the form of
compensation rule depends upon the various interest groups affected. Section 4
contains a policy discussion of the major results. Section 5 contains a conclusion.
2. The Model
Assume initially that a national accounting standard setter allocates its
expenditure in standard setting activities to two forms of accounting standards, one of
which affects generally accepted accounting principles (‘national-GAAP’) used by
national-based firms and another acceptable for GAAP used by multinational firms to
meet international stock exchange listing requirements (‘international-GAAP’). Once
expenditures in these activities have been made the market value of the accounting
standards thereby promulgated is revealed, at which time the private property rights to
issue international-GAAP standards can be revoked
For the purposes of the foregoing discussion, expenditures in standard setting
activities are assumed to be nonstorable and perfectly divisible. These are compactly
denoted by the level of expenditure (in the form of time, energy amd money) q xt  and
g(y), where x and y are expenditure levels and t  e  {0,1} is the property right needed to
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issue international-GAAP accounting standards, where t  = 1 means that the property
right has been retained and t  = 0 means that it has been revoked. I assume that g’ > 0
and g" < 0. Since these expenditures cannot be stored, set y = 1 - x. When property
rights are revoked then the expenditure in setting international-GAAP accounting
standards. I follow the property rights literature in referring to the revocation of
property rights as a taking. For ease of discussion, the model is applied to the specific
case of an international-GAAP standard that can by set by a national accounting
standard setter involving a relatively high level of expenditure or, alternatively by the
IASC with no incremental accounting standard setting expenditure.7
For the national accounting standard setter, investment g(1 - x) can be viewed
as risk-free in two dimensions. First it does not require any deliberations on complex
and contentious issues associated with developing international-GAAP, and second,
they are not subject to any regulatory-induced uncertainty. These assumptions are
made only for convenience. Expenditures q xt are ’risky’ in the sense that property
rights may be taken, and, if they are not, they are subject to regulatory uncertainty.
Let q  represent the regulatory risk, where q  is distributed according to the pdf f(q ),
where f(q ) > 0 "  q  ˛  [ q 0,q 1] and f(q ) = 0 otherwise.
When rights to set international-GAAP accounting standards are taken away
from the national accounting standard setter, they are given instead to the IASC, who
presumably sets such standards instead with an expenditure saving of b .8 Let b  be a
random variable that is distributed according to the pdf h(b ) > 0 " b  ˛  [ b 0,b 1] and
h(b ) = 0 otherwise. Unless otherwise specified, it will be assumed that h(b ) > 0 " b  ˛
[ b 0,b 1]. The state of the world is given by the pair ( q ,b ).
When property rights are revoked, a national-based regulator is assumed to
compensate the national accounting standard setter C(q x). I assume that C(q x) can be
precommitted to in that once a cost is established for setting international-GAAP
accounting standards it must be known. Note that this politically-determined cost is
not a function b . Although the ‘market value’ of this lost property right can be made
verifiable to a court of law, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible to
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empirically observe this value in setting international-GAAP accounting standards.9
Thus one can interpret the compensation schedule, C(q x), as an incomplete contract.
The taking action is represented by the function t (q ,b / w ) ˛  {0,1}, where
t (q ,b / w ) = 0 means that the property rights is taken, t (q ,b / w ) = 1 means that it has not
and ’w ' is a parameter that relates to the regulatory authority’s preferences.
In summary, timing and information structure of Giammarino and Nosals’
(1994) three date model is as follows. At date t
-1 the rules governing compensation
for taking accounting standard property rights are established by IOSCO. Once these
rules are established IOSCO 'vanishes' from the scene. Between dates t
-1  and t0, all
the remaining (economic) agents are 'born'. At this time all the agents are
symmetrically and imperfectly informed. Specifically, (i) no agent knows the true
state of the world, (ii) all hold identical probability distributions over the state of the
world, and (iii) all know the politically-determined compensation schedule C(q x). At
date t0, accounting standard setting expenditures are incurred (when information is
still imperfect). Between dates t0 and t1 all agents learn the true state of the world
(q ,b ). At date t1 the takings decision is made and final compensation is paid.
2.1. The National Accounting Standard Setter
The national accounting standard setter owns the property rights to issue
accounting standards which involve capital expenditures for initially establishing the
standard setting procedure (a constant) as well as expenditures of types q x and g(y).
At date t0, before the state is revealed but after the compensation rule is in place, the
national accounting standard setter selects the level of standard setting expenditure x
˛  [0,1] and y = 1 - x in order to maximize their expected payoff, Ul (x/C,t ), where












 (q ,b ) =  g(1 - x) + t (q ,b / w )C(q x) + (1 - t ((q ,b / w ))q x.
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The solution to the national accounting standard setter’s problem is denoted as x.
2.2. The IASC
The IASC does not initially incur any expenditures in setting international-
GAAP accounting standards for the country analysed here.10 However it receives the
benefit of any taking decision and pays any compensation to secure the property right













c(q ,b ) = t(q ,b / w )(b - v(q x))
and v(q x) is the fee paid to the regulator for gaining accounting standard setting
rights.11 Following Giammarino and Nosal (1994) I will compactly represent the
preferences of the IASC by US(x,C,t ).
2.3. The Regulatory Authority
The regulatory authority is given the power by IOSCO (see below) to revoke
the national standard setter’s property rights to issue accounting standards at time t1.
12
But in so doing it must abide by the compensation rule established by IOSCO at time
t
-1. That rule requires that the regulatory body compensate the national accounting
standard setter according to the schedule C(q x) when property rights are revoked and
that sufficient costs are charged to the IASC to avoid a deficit.13 Since the regulatory
authority acts after expenditures have been made and knowing the state of the world,
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it will base the taking decision on the ex post payoffs to the national standard setter
and to the IASC.
The specification of the regulatory authority’s objective function reflects the
extent to which its action is influenced by votes, their own beliefs, lobbying or bribes
by the competing standard setters etc. The regulatory authority’s objective function
will be to maximise
max G(t ,q ,b / w ) = w p l(q ,b ) + (1 - w )p c(q ,b )
     t ( q , b /w ) ˛ {0,1}
subject to the budget constraint
v(q x) - C(q x) = 0
where w  ˛  [0,1] is a weight that reflects the importance of the two constituencies to
the regulatory authority. When w  = 0.5, the regulatory authority is ‘benevolent’ in the
sense that its objectives are in line with that of IOSCO. In addition to w  = 0.5,
consider the case where w  = 0, ie the regulatory authority ‘cares’ only for the IASC -
and where w  = 1 ie., the regulatory authority ‘cares’ only about the national standard
setter. It may be the case that the regulatory authority is indifferent between taking
and not taking property rights. In this circumstance, it is assume that the regulatory
authority takes that action which maximises IOSCO’s objective function. Following
Giammarino and Nosal (1994) the solution to the regulatory authority’s problem is




IOSCO establishes a rule, C(q x) governing the taking of property
rights at date t
1
. IOSCO’s problem can be viewed as a single principal, two agent
problem. Formally, IOSCO’s problem is
max W(x,t ,C(q x) = Us(x,C,t ) + UF(x/C,t )        (SW)
         {C( q x)}
subject to
Ul (x/C,t ) > Ul(x/C,t ) "  x  ˛ [0,1]        (ICl)
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and "  b  ˛  [ b 0,b 1] and "  q  e  [q 0, q 1]
G(t ,q ,b ) > G(t ,q ,b ), t  ˛  {0,1}        (ICi)
Define W(x,t,C(q x)) to be the social welfare function for the setting of accounting
standards and it is this which IOSCO seeks to maximize. The constraints (ICl) and
(ICi) represent the incentive constraints for the established accounting standard setter
and the regulatory authority, respectively. {(SW), (ICl),(ICp)} is referred to as
IOSCO’s constrained problem. For simplicity attention is restricted to linear
compensation schedules i.e: C(q x) = a + bq x.
3. Development of Propositions
This property rights model presented above yields propositions which could
be employed to develop predictions about the nature of the compensation payable for
the taking of property rights under various scenarios. The Giammarino and Nosal
(1994) model is now applied to investigate each of these possibilities. In each case the
predicted regulatory outcome is found to depend on with which interest group the
regulatory authority’s preferences coincide.
3.1. Regulator’s Preferences Coincide with That of IOSCO
First consider the case where the regulatory authority’s and political body’s
preferences coincide, i.e. w  = 0.5. Giammarino and Nosal (1994) show that it is
always possible to implement a first best allocation through a lump sum
compensation schedule that is independent of the market value of the taken property
right.
As a benchmark this outcome is characterized by solving an unconstrained
political problem {(SW)}. IOSCO chooses a level of accounting standard setting
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expenditure x ˛  [0,1] and a function m:[b 0,b 1] È [q 0,q 1], ie: q  = m(b ). The function
m relates to the taking decision. Specifically, for the state of the world ( q ,b ), if m(b ) >
q , then a taking occurs and if m(b ) < q , then a taking does not occur.















( ( )m t
b f(s)h(t)dsdt + g(1 - x)
The first order conditions to IOSCO’s problem can be simplified to
q  = m(b ) = b           (1)  








q  f(s)h(t)dsdt - g’(1 - x) = 0           (2)
Condition (1) defines the set of states where, for a given x, the benefit of IASC setting
international-GAAP accounting standards equals the market value. That is, for a
given m, condition (2) establishes the first best level of standard setting expenditure –
the point where the expected marginal private benefits from the IASC setting
international-GAAP standards is equal to the marginal private benefits of them being
established by a national accounting standard setting body. The findings of this
section are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 1: When the regulatory authority has preferences that coincide with
IOSCO, it is always possible to implement the set of first best allocations by
having a compensation rule that is completely independent of market value
associated with setting international-GAAP accounting standards.
This result implies that it is possible to implement the first best with a
compensation rule that is completely independent of the market value of setting
international-GAAP accounting standards. However it should be noted that when the
level of expenditure in accounting standard setting activities can affect the takings
decision, i.e. if a = b = 0, there will be over-expenditure in the accounting standard
setting activity. In this situation the national accounting standard setter will overspend
in standard setting activities in order to reduce the probability of a taking.14
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3.2. Regulator’s Preferences Coincide with that of the IASC
The next two sections examine various scenarios available under second best
implementations as identified by Giammario and Nosal (1994). In each case the
optimal compensation schedule is examined where incentive constraints (ICl) and
(ICi) both bind, that is, when IOSCO’s problem is given by {(SW), (ICl), (ICi)}.  In
these cases assume that w  = 0. Given the objectives of the regulatory authority, the
















(a + bsx)h(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 - x)
     x


















bsh(t)f(s)dtds = 0                      (3)
IOSCO’s constrained problem is given by














th(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 - x)
         {a,b,x}

























































 (b2s2x - ab2s2 - b3s3x)h’(a + bsx)f(s)ds) = 0               (6)
As might be expected, the optimal compensation schedule will not be
independent of the market value of setting international-GAAP accounting standards,
as demonstrated in the following proposition:
Proposition 2: When the preferences of the regulatory authority coincide with
that of the IASC, the optimal compensation schedule must depend upon the
market value of the international-GAAP accounting standard setting
expenditure incurred by the national accounting standard setter, i.e., b „ 0.
Proof of Proposition 2: See the appendix.
The implication of Proposition 2 is that the market value associated with the
expenditure incurred by the national-based accounting standard setter in developing
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international-GAAP accounting standards is an important tool in aligning its interests
with that of the regulatory authority and the IASC. The intuition is that, when the
regulatory authority is only concerned with the welfare of the IASC, it must be
induced to internalize the foregone national accounting standard setting body’s
expenditure, q x. To see this, suppose that b is set to zero and a > 0. In this case the
regulatory authority will take whenever b  > a independent of the lost accounting
standard setting activity. But for efficient taking decisions one must compare q x with
b . When b „  0, the regulatory authority’s decision must reflect a measure of foregone
expenditure via  the compensation schedule.
3.3. Regulatory Authority’s Preferences Coincide with that of the National
Accounting Standard Setter
Giammarino and Nosal (1994) show that the case where the regulatory
authority cares only about the national accounting standard setter is in a sense
'qualitively different' from the previous case. Given the preferences of the regulatory
authority, it is not inherently interested in b  and, except for a = 0 and b = 1, cannot be
made to internalize b  through the compensation schedule.
Given the compensation a + bq x, the national accounting standard setter’s











(a + bsx)f(s)ds + g(1 - x)
      x











bsf(s)ds - g’(1 - x) = 0                           (7)
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Note that the above functions are well defined only if b = 1. Following Giammarino
and Nosal (1994), proceed by restricting b ˛  ´ \{1}. IOSCO’s constrained problem is
given by













th(t)f(s)dtds + g(1 - x)            (8)
         {a,b,x}
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  = 0
(10)





sf(s)ds > 0, it must be the case that l  = 0. If IOSCO’s unconstrained problem is
given by (8), then the optimal level of international-GAAP based accounting standard





sf(s)ds - g’(1 - x)   =   0                        (11)
Equations (11) and (7) will be equal to one another - and thus constraint (7) will not
bind in IOSCO’s problem {(8),(7)} - if b = 0. The optimal compensation schedule is a
constant payment.
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th(t)dt. Given that it is















































In this case the takings decision already reflects the value of foregone
expenditure, i.e. the regulatory authority has the preferences of the national
accounting standard setter. Furthermore, for any compensation rule in which b = 0
there is another compensation rule with b = 0 which results in the same takings
decision. On the other hand, setting b = 0 distorts the international-GAAP accounting
standard setting expenditure  decision. The optimal compensation rule is one in which
b = 0 and a set in a way that deals with the takings decision. Giammarino and Nosal
(1994) conclude that by setting a = E(b ),  the takings decision will be correct on
average.
The above analysis can be summarised by the following proposition:
Proposition 3: If the regulatory authority has preferences that coincide with that
of the national standard setter, then the optimal compensation will be either a
lump sum payment or the market value of the national accounting standard
setter’s activity. The lump sum payment schedule, a, is characterized by a =
E(B ) with inefficiencies associated with both taking and accounting standard
setting expenditure decisions. The market value compensation schedule is
characterized by efficient taking decisions and over-expenditure by the national
accounting standard setting body.
- 17 -
4. Policy Discussion
The Giammarino and Nosal (1994) model has been applied to characterize
optimal compensation schemes under various assumptions pertaining to the










) represents the optimal compensation schedule when the
regulatory authority’s preferences are w . As noted by Giammarino and Nosal (1994),
there are however a number of practical issues associated with such a compensation
schedule that must be addressed, each of which are briefly discussed below.
It is not, for instance, possible to specify a compensation schedule that is a
function of the preferences of the regulatory authority alone. One could amend the
analysis so that IOSCO holds priors over the ‘type’ of regulatory authority that will
execute the taking decision and one could characterize the optimal compensation
schedule that results when the schedule is independent of the preferences of the
regulatory authority. IOSCO would, therefore, specify a compensation schedule that
is essentially a fixed payment parameter a and a slope parameter, b. Given that a
w
 > 0
for some w  and b
w
 > 0, it will be the case that both a and b will be positive.
Although expenditure in setting international-GAAP accounting standards is
well defined in the Giammarino and Nosal (1994) model, they note in reality this is
not the case. For example, suppose that two sets of national-based international
GAAP accounting standards differ only with respect to their distribution of the
random variable q . The optimal compensation schedules will, therefore, be different
for the two accounting standard setting activities. However, in order to implement
these compensation schedules one would have to be able to verify that, for example,
that the expected market value of accounting standard setting expenditure is higher
for one set of standards than the other, where this expected value is calculated in some
previous period – even though their market values may be identical today. This being
the case, the optimal compensation schedule cannot be made a function of the
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characteristics of the standard setting activity (other than its market value). The
compensation schedule can only specify a single pair (a, b) that applies to all
accounting standard setting activities. Again, it will be the case that a > 0 and b > 0.
Another practical problem that arises relates to what exactly is meant by a
taking. In the model presented above, a taking is well defined; in practice this may not
be the case. For example, suppose that the national-based international GAAP
accounting standard setting activity that is subject to a taking (in the above model)
can be subdivided into n standards, each ‘owned’ by individual sub-accounting
standard setting activities.15 The benefit associated with taking any one of the
standards is B /n and the lost accounting standard setting activity is q x/n. Suppose that
it turns out that the regulatory authority has preferences that coincide with the
national accounting standard setter, B  < q x and a + bq x < q x. If the regulatory
authority could only take all the accounting standard setting activity or none of it,
then it would make the optimal decision of not taking that activity. If the regulatory
authority could instead make n takings – because, after all the regulatory authority is
taking from n separate accounting standards – then the regulatory authority will make
n takings if a + bq x > x/n. For large enough n, the regulatory authority will always
take the entire accounting standard setting activity. A national accounting standard
setter could always arrange itself so the n is large.16 Thus, the existence of the fixed
payment implies that there will be ‘too many takings’ when the regulatory authority
has preferences that coincide with the national accounting standard setter. Holding all
else constant, a should be reduced.
Based on this type of reasoning, Giammarino and Nosal (1994) argue that in a
sense the parameter a in the compensation function has ‘lost’ its economic relevance.
First, its existence adversely affects the takings decision. Second, the reason for
having a fixed payment component in the compensation schedule has been greatly
diminished. Recall that the fixed payment component exists only to elicit appropriate
accounting standard setting activity. Since the compensation schedule now applies to
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all takings – the usefulness to have a > 0 as a means of obtaining the ‘right’ level
standard setting expenditure has, for all practical purposes, vanished.17
For these (practical) reasons, Giammarino and Nosal (1994) conclude that a
compensation schedule should be set at a = 0. This value would be the ‘optimal’
setting for b if one could condition on the type of regulatory authority. They
demonstrate that if w  = 0.5, then b = 0, i.e., with b = 0 there is over-expenditure. If the
regulatory authority has preferences that coincide with that of IOSCO, then b > 0. To
see this suppose that b = 0. In this case the regulatory authority would always making
a takings decision. The national accounting standard setting body, anticipating this,
would set x = 0. Given that some accounting standard setting activity is subject to a
taking which is socially desirable, it must be that b > 0. Finally, if the regulatory
authority has preferences that coincide with the IASC, then b  = 1 strictly dominates b
= 0, i.e., both deliver the same level of expenditure, but b  = 1 makes the ex post
socially optimal takings decision. If expenditure and compensation cannot be made
conditional on the preferences of the regulatory authority and the priors of the
political body place positive weights on w  = 0, then it will be the case that the
compensation schedule will specify b > 0. In summary, taking account of practical
considerations of implementing a compensation rule imply that the compensation
payment should be set to some proportion of market value.
5. Conclusion
This paper has applied a model for analysing the taking of property rights
developed by Giammarino and Nosal [1994] to analyse competition among a national
accounting standard setter and the IASC over the promulgation of international-
GAAP that are endorsed by IOSCO. This dispute can only be resolved by the
imposition of compensation rule by a regulatory authority. The regulatory authority’s
decision as to the optimal form of compensation rule that must be paid for taking
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away this property right was analysed, under various assumptions about with which
accounting standard setting body its preferences might coincide.
The analysis demonstrates that when the behaviour of the regulatory authority
deviates from that of IOSCO, the market value of the taking becomes an important
factor in determining the compensation payment. When a first best implementation is
not possible then an optimal, politically-determined compensation rule for the taking
of property rights to set international-GAAP accounting standards by the IASC is one
which must account for the incentives of all three interest groups which are party to
its implementation – in this case the regulatory authority and both the competing
accounting standard setters.
However, when one considers the practical problems that might be encountered
in attempting to implement the optimal compensation that is suggested by the model
in practice, it is concluded that the compensation payment for the taking decision
should be set as a fraction of market value. In practical terms, this market value is not
quantifiable but rather is defined in terms of rule-making power derived from a zero
sum game struggle for political influence. Thus the compensation schedule desired by
the ‘winner’ (i.e.: the IASC) must also be acceptable to the ‘losers’, who can either
directly lobby IOSCO against the takings decision or otherwise attempt to gain ex
post influence over the rule-making processes of the IASC itself.
When viewed purely as a political process, competition among accounting
standard setters over the promulgation of internationally acceptable GAAP provides
opportunities for national-based regulatory authorities to secure political influence
over IASC deliberations by developing compensation schedules to take property
rights away from the national standard setter and confer it upon the IASC. The
success of this process ultimately depends upon the willingness of each body to
accommodate political compromise. Further research is needed to examine whether
the propositions developed here can be applied to particular institutional settings.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Examples of this literature include De Alessi (1969), Blume et al. (1974), Epstein
(1985), Fischel and Shapiro (1988) and Giammarino and Nosal (1994).
2. Within the past twelve months this type of takings decision has recently been made
by regulatory authorities in Australia and many Eastern European and Asian
countries. The likely and imminent endorsement of IASC standards IOSCO in mid-
1998 will likely increase pressures for national regulators in other Anglo-American
countries.
3. This is a reasonable assumption if national-based accounting standards are more
onerous than IASC-determined standards.
4. For ease of exposition, I assume that initially only a single national standard setter
issues accounting standards. Of course in practice this may not necessarily be the
case.
5. Klumpes (1998) applies Becker’s (1983) model to develop a theory of competition
among multiple interest groups over the determination of accounting standards.
6. For a discussion of this conflict, see Beresford (1997) [United States of America]
and Langford (1997) [United Kingdom].
7. This difference arises from the economy-of-scale advantages of the IASC
producing a single set of harmonised international-GAAP standards.
8. The assumption that the IASC can set standards at a lower level of expenditure than
the established accounting standard setting is made for convenience only.
9. One could however in an ex post sense define these activities in terms of the
opportunity costs of firms using national-based versus IASC-based international-
GAAP. Adopting IASC standards restricts the ability otherwise available to corporate
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managers to self-select those national-based standards that allow income smoothing.
10. This is because the IASC is presumed to have previously incurred capital
expenditures in setting international-GAAP accounting standards.
11. The assumption that privately-funded accounting standard setting bodies are taxed
in this manner is made so that the discussion focuses on the takings issue. If this
assumption were relaxed, then the more general problem of optimal taxation to
support government regulation of accounting standards would need to be addressed.
12. In Anglo-American countries, the legal existence of such a publicly-funded
regulatory authority is presumably established under corporate laws which require
firms to comply with that country’s GAAP (e.g.: the Securities and Exchanges
Commission (USA), Australian Securities Commission (Australia).
13. This is equivalent to the notion of a political zero-sum game (Becker, 1983).
14. One can envisage this situation arising in those Anglo-American countries where
national standard setting bodies have already established an independently developed
‘conceptual framework’ (e.g.: UK, USA).
15. The IASC frequently ‘cherry picks’ what it perceives to be ‘best practice’ from the
plethora of national accounting standards that exist on a particular issue.
16. This form of accounting standard setting behaviour has previously been
documented. Walker (1987) observes that just prior to the sanctioning of Australian
accounting standards the Australian Accounting Research Foundation issued many
accounting standards on various issues.
17. In any case these expenditures are ‘sunk’ and are unlikely to be recoverable via
political influence over subsequent IASC standard setting deliberations.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2 (Giammarino and Nosal, 1994).
Assume the contrary, i.e.: that b = 0. Equation (2) becomes







sxh(t)f(s)dtds = g’(1 - x)          (A.1)







sxh(t)f(s)dtds = g’(1 - x) - lg"(1 - x).                     (A.2)
Equations (A.1) and (A.2) imply that l = 0. If b = l = 0, then equation (4) becomes
a = xE(q ),








But E(q 2) = (E(q ))2, a contradiction. Thus it cannot be that b = 0.
Q.E.D.
